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never been under her control, a presumption of gift does not arise.18
The use by the husband of income from the wife's separate estate is
sometimes presumed a gift,1 9 even in those jurisdictions where a
transfer of other property of the wife is presumed to be a loan ;20
likewise, where either spouse improves realty of the other.21
The rule that a loan is presumed is based upon the realization
that a wife commonly intrusts the management of her business to
her husband,22 and the rule that a gift is presumed, upon the con-
tention that "emancipated" woman is afforded the same opportunity
to protect her property rights as is her husband.23
It is submitted that the instant case is not in harmony with the
true intent and purposes of the married women's acts, for it gives
woman a legal equality which stiips her of actual equality. If her
husband gains control of her property, she has the burden of show-
ing it was not given to him. The cases holding that a presumption
of a loan arises recognize that husbands do use their position to gain
control of property of their wives; and those cases protect the actual
independence of the wife and her property by placing on the hus-
band or his creditors the burden of showing it was given to him.
A. E. GARRETT, JR.
Injunctions-Prerequisites for Preliminary Mandatory
Injunctions.
Petitioner, executor under a will, was removed for his refusal to
comply with a court order to account for $80,000 worth of the es-
tate's government bonds which he claimed to be his own. Upon
"Morris v. Westerman, 79 W. Va. 502, 92 S. E. 567 (1917), 3 A. L. R.
1237 (1919); 12 R. C. L. 928.
"Adoue v. Spencer, supra note 15.
Colangelo v. Colangelo, supra note 15; Haymond v. Bledsoe, 11 Ind. App.
202, 38 N. E. 530, 54 Am. St. Rep. 502 (1894) ; Estate of Hauer, 140 Pa. 420,
21 Atl. 445, 23 Am. St. Rep. 245 (1891) ; 13 R. C. L. 1387; see Etheredge v.
Cochran, supra note 15, at 685.
2 Am. Finance Co. v. Leedy, supra note 17. Improvements made during
marriage on separate property of either spouse, although with community
funds, belong to spouse owning the separate property. Dunn v. Mullan, 211
Cal. 583, 296 Pac. 604 (1931), 77 A. L. R. 1015 (1932). Expenditures by
either spouse on the other's property presumed gifts, therefore not basis for
equitable lien. Nixon v. Nixon, 100 N. J. Eq. 437, 135 Atl. 516 (1927);
Anderson v. Anderson, 177 N. C. 401, 99 S. E. 106 (1919). Husband's payment
of mortgage indebtedness on property taken by entireties presumed gift so
far as wife was relieved of contribution. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158
Md. 372, 148 At!. 444 (1930).
2 Etheredge v. Cochran, supra note 15.
1 Brunswick Bank & Trust Co. v. Valentine, .'upra note 17, at 571.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
affidavits of petitioner's insolvency and fraudulent conduct, the court
granted a preliminary mandatory injunction requiring petitioner to
surrender the bonds to a receiver appointed by the court. The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals denied petitioner's application
for a writ of prohibition to restrain the enforcement of the decree.1
Preliminary injunctions are issued for the purpose of preserving
and protecting the status quo until final determination of the rights
of the parties.2 While a few cases hold that an interlocutory injunc-
tion can only be preventive or prohibitive,3 it is generally held that
equity may in a proper case thus compel the performance of an affirm-
ative act.4 But such power is never exercised, except in a case of
urgent necessity where there is injury or prospective injury to a clear
right and where there is no other adequate remedy for complainant,
who has acted promptly and in good faith. 5 Conversely, where the
propriety of the relief is doubtful it will be denied.6
Preliminary mandatory injunctions have been most frequently
issued where an easement or right of way, or water course, public
or private, has been unlawfully obstructed to complainant's irrep-
1 State ex rel. Donley v. Baker, Judge, 164 S. E. 154 (W. Va. 1932).
2 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730 (N. D. Ohio
1893), appeal dismissed, 150 U. S. 393, 14 Sup. Ct. 123, 37 L. ed. 1120 (1893) ;
Powhatan Coal & Coke Co. v. Ritz, 60 W. Va. 395, 56 S. E. 257, 9 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1225 (1906) ; BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY" (10th ed. 1923) §400.
3 In Audenreid v. Philadelphia etc., R. Co., 68 Pa. St. 370, 375, 8 Am.
Rep. 195, 196 (1871), Judge Sharswood declared ". . . the authorities, both
in England and this country, are very clear that an interlocutory or prelimi-
nary injunction cannot be mandatory." But see Klein, Mandatory Injunctions
(1898) 12 HAxv. L. RPv. 95, where the author pictorially presents the case for
preliminary mandatory injunctions, with especial emphasis on English cases.
World's Columbian Exposition Co. v. Brennan, 51 Ill. App. 128 (1893)
(obstruction of public way); Rogers Locomotive Works v. Erie Ry. Co.,
20 N. J. Eq. 379 (1869) (possible exception in case of obstruction to ease-
ment); to the effect that a court cannot compel the undoing of an act, see
Washington Univ. v. Green, 1 Md. Ch. 97 (1847); Note (1890) 6 L. R. A.
855, 857.
As to statutory prohibition of mandatory injunctions, see GA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1926) §5499. But see (1931) 17 VA. L. REv. 810, 813-814.
'Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., supra note 2; Pokegama Sugar-
Pine Lumber Co. v. Klamath River Lumber Co., 86 Fed. 528 (C.. C. N. D.
Cal. 1898) ; Leakesville Mills v. Spray Water Power and Land Co., 183 N. C.
511, 112 S. E. 24 (1922) ; cases cited in 32 C. J. 24, §7, note 45; Klein, supra
note 3. Note (1886) 20 Am. Dec. 389, 398.
rPoamoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) §1359; see cases cited
infra notes 8-16; especially is this so where the act complained of is willful
and fraudulent; Popham v. Wright, 229 S. W. 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
'National Docks, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 54 N. J. Eq. 10,
33 Atl. 219 (1895) (crossing over another railroad, injunction granted in'
part) ; Florida E. C. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 56 Fla. 788, 47 So. 345 (1908) (opera-
tion of spur track off regular line).
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arable injury. In such instance equity will order the removal of the
obstruction. 7 Especially is this so where the obstruction was in
violation of a court order.8 Ordinary encroachments will not usually
be disturbed before final hearing,9 but where one has unlawfully
torn down a structure he may be compelled to restore it.10 Pending
final hearing, real or personal property will not be transferred from
one party to another except where the defendant wrongfully obtained
possession and the complainant acted promptly."1 However, the de-
7 Cole Silver Min. Co. v. Va. & Gold Hill Water Co., 1 Sawy. 685, Fed.
Cas. No. 2990 (C. C. D. Nev. 1871) (diversion of subterranean stream used
by complainant) ; Johnson v. Superior Court of Tulare County, 65 Cal. 567, 4
Pac. 575 (1884) (diversion of water by dam); Ryan v. Weiser Valley Land
& Water Co., 20 Idaho 288, 118 Pac. 769 (1911) (alternative of restoring dam
or paying $2,500 and continuing the injury) ; Schneitzius v. Bailey, 45 N. J.
Eq. 178, 13 Atl. 247 (1888) (obstruction to ravine as water course); Car-
penter v. Gold, 88 Va. 551, 14 S. E. 329 (1892) (boundary stream watering
complainant's stock).
Williamson v. McMonagle, 9 Del. Ch. 380, 83 Atl. 139 (1912) (windbreak
across alley used thirty years) ; Zetrouer v. Zetrouer, 89 Fla. 253, 103 So. 625
(1925) (fence across road connecting farm and home); Salisbury v. An-
drews, 128 Mass. 336 (1880) (courtyard providing entrance and lijht);
Hodge v. Giese, 43 N. J. Eq. 342, 11 At. 484 (1887) (access to basement heater
through defendant's shop) ; Leakesville Mills Co. v. Spray Water Power and
Land Co., supra note 4 (right of way from factory to highway) ; Kennedy v.
Klammer, 104 W. Va. 198, 139 S. E. 713 (1927) (fence across street leading
to complainant's property).
Isfiunction denied: Gardner v. Stroever, 81 Cal. 148, 22 Pac. 483 (1889) (ob-
struction to ingress and egress of place of business) ; World's Columbian
Exposition Co. v. Brennan, supra note 3; Dobrinsky v. Boyland, 222 I1. App.
494 (1921) (public road); Ladd v. Flynn, 90 Mich. 181, 51 N. W. 203 (1892)
(line fence obstructing window).
' In Keys v. Alligood, 178 N. C. 16, 100 S. E. 113 (1919) the defendant
obstructed a road in violation of a court order not to interfere with or use
the road except for ingress and egress. A preliminary mandatory injunction
ordered the ditches restored to their former locus.
' Dallas Hunting & Fishing Club v. Dallas County Levee District, 235 S.
W. 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (levee erected at cost of $400,000, causing
only negligible damage to complainant; Williams v. Silverman Constr. Co., 111
App. Div. 679, 97 N. Y. Supp. 945 (1906) (bay windows projecting over set-
back line); Novi v. Del Prete, 121 Misc. Rep. 637, 202 N. Y. Supp. 86 (1923)
(wall encroachment).101n Pierce v. City of New Orleans, 18 La. Ann. 242 (1865) defendant
was required to restore a boundary wall in which he had unlawfully made
apertures.
1Denial of relief as to real property: Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 116 Iowa 681, 88 N. W. 1082 (1902) (claim by
purchaser against condemnation claimant); Arnold v. Bright, 41 Mich, 207.
2 N. W. 16 (1879) (lessee for term of years not ousted on ex parte applica-
tion) ; Stephens v. Stephens, 87 Fla. 466, 100 So. 746 (1924) (wife versus
husband owner); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Graves, 66 Neb. 17, 92 N. W.
144 (1902) (administrator of deceased owner versus lessee in possession);
Proctor v. Stuart, 4 Okla. 679, 46 Pac. 501 (1896) (disputing homesteaders).
As to disputes over church property see: Whitecar v. Michenor, 37 N. J. Eq.
6 (1883); Fredericks v. Huber, 180 Pa. 572,- 37 Atl. 90 (1897); Tebo v.
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fendant may be preliminarily dispossessed of personalty if it is being
or is about to be dissipated in violation of the rights of others.1 2 In
case of a clear printa facie breach of duty by a public servant or pub-
lic corporation the court will by interlocutory decree order service to
an individual or the general public where other relief is inadequate.13
Hazel, 74 Atl. 841 (Del. Ch. 1909) (relief denied though defendants were in
possession through wrongful conveyances).
But property was ordered transferred in Pokegama Sugar-Pine Lumber Co.
v. Klamath River Lumber & Improvement Co., supra note 4 (lessors wrong-
fully ousted lessee) ; in Sproat v. Durland, 2 Okla. 24, 35 Pac. 682, dissent
at page 886 (1894) (between homesteaders where one is a trespasser) ; and
in Hodges v. Christmas, 212 S. W. 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919), where the
complainant had been forceably and fraudulently ejected from oil land.
Where transfer of personal property was refused: Hutton v. Hammond, 194
Ind. 212, 142 N. E. 427, 32 A. L. R. 888 (1924) (architect's data in his posses-
sion after performance of building contract); Crossland v. Crossland, 53
W. Va. 108, 44 S. E. 424 (1903) (attempt to get the property to sell) ; Spoor-
Thompson Machine Co. v. Bennett Film Laboratories, 105 N. J. Eq. 108,
147 At. 202 (1929) (film-developing machines made under contract, there
being bond to prevent irreparable injury); Moller v. Lincoln Safe Deposit
Co., 174 App. Div. 458, 161 N. Y. Supp. 171 (1916) (access to safe deposit
box in dispute). But wrongfully possessed personalty was transferred in
McCullom v. Morrison, 14 Fla. 414 (1874), where the litigation was over the
location of a Confederate monument unlawfully removed. A mortgagee was
given possession of rolling stock levied upon and about to be dispersed in
impairment of his security. Central Trust Co. v. Moran, 56 Minn. 188,
57 N. W. 471 (1894).
See also Note (1924) 32 A. L. R. 894-918, on transfer of property by pre-
liminary order.
' Ordinarily the defendant must be insolvent or otherwise irresponsible. The
best view requires that the court take custody of the property. Fargo v. Rider,
36 S. W. 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896) (irresponsible assignee of fraudulent
vendee required to pay into court money realized from sale of goods);
Murrah v. Shirley, 237 S. W. 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (money from
check cashed by stakeholder in violation of conditional delivery, the condi-
tion having failed); McCarty v. McCarty, 40 S. W. (2d) 165 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931) (preservation of community property during divorce proceedings).
Relief was denied in State ex tel. Brookfield Co. v. Mart, 135 Ore. 603, 295
Pac. 459 (1931) (contempt proceedings for failure to turn over warrants and
money to court) ; in Trust Co. of Florida v. Crider, 136 So. 434 (Fla. 1931)
(money from trustee's sale of building and stock); and in Sims v. Stuart,
291 Fed. 707 (S. D. N. Y. 1922) (where customs officer seized money, Hand,
J., seeing no necessity for equity to hurry the legal cause).
" Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., supra note 4 (railroad traffic
facilities); Mason v. Byrley, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 487, 84 S. W. 767 (1904) (Can-
vassing votes by district committee); Broome v. N. Y. & N. J. Tel. Co.,
42 N. J. Eq. 141, 7 Atl. 851 (1887) (erecting telephone poles unlawfully);
McCran v. Public Service Ry. Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 22, 122 Atl. 205 (1923) (for
street railway service pending mandamus proceedings during strike), discussed
in (1923) 37 HARv. L. REv. 368, at 371; Clinton-Dunn Tel. Co. v. Carolina
Tel. Co., 159 N. C. 9, 74 S. E. 636 (1912) (Hoke, J., discussing the use of
mandamus and preliminary mandatory injunctions); City of Houston v.
Little, 244 S. W. 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (city school board). See
Farrall v. Hood, 32 S. W. (2d) 480, 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (attorney
not allowed to see jailed client). Injunction denied in City Council v. Fort
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Preliminary mandatory injunctions in the nature of specific per-
formance, however, issue very rarely.14 Courts occasionally adopt
this form of relief for abating nuisances. 15
The case under discussion has all the prerequisites necessary for
a preliminary mandatory injunction. In view of petitioner's con-
duct, his insolvency, and the possible dissipation of part of the de-
cedent's estate, the court quite properly invoked the provisional rem-
edy to place the bonds in the custody of the court until final hearing.
At that time the petitioner may set up his claim and have his rights
adjudicated. The court wisely took that course in preference to
transferring the property to the other claimants. While the case
turns in part on a West Virginia statute16 providing for the equi-
table protection of property in a case pending, that statute only
strengthens the court's hand.
WM. CAREY PARKER.
Insurance-Incontestable Clause as Defense in Action on
Life Policy.
The plaintiff issued a life insurance policy containing a liability
exemption clause in case insured met his death while engaged in rail-
road employment. A statute provided that life insurance policies
Worth, etc., Contractors, Inc., 8 S. W. (2d) 730 (Tex Civ. App. 1928)
(revocation of plumber's license).
. In Boskowitz v. Cohn, 197 App. Div. 776, 189 N. Y. Supp. 419 (1921)
an injunction ousted sub-lessees where lessees sub-leased in violation of a
condition in their lease giving lessors right to possession without notice in
case of breach, and in Kellerman v. Chase & Co., 101 Fla. 785, 135 So. 127
(1931), the court ordered -performance of contract to deliver tomato crop, it
being highly perishable. See also American Lead Pencil Co. v. Schneegass, 178
Fed. 735 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1910) where mandatory relief was properly refused.
Where complainant acted in bad faith relief was denied in Winton Motor
Carriage Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 196 Fed. 906 (E. D. Pa. 1912) )contract for
commercial advertising in periodical). Accord: Amalgamated Furniture Fac-
tories, Inc. v. Rochester Times-Union, Inc., 128 Misc. Rep. 673, 219 N. Y.
Supp. 705 (1927).
"Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kelley, 77 N. J. Eq. 129, 75 Atl. 758 (1910) (de-
fective building a public and private nuisance which must be removed or
repaired) ; Salisbury v. Andrews, 128 Mass. 336 (1880) (light and sunshine
shut out by alley obstruction) ; Pierce v. City of New Orleans, supra note 11;
relief refused in Ort v. Bowden, 148 S. W. 1145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (base-
ball park blocking street).
-*2W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 53, art. 6, §1: "A court of equity may, in a proper
case pending therein, in which funds or property of a corporation, firm or
person is involved, and there is danger of the loss or misappropriation of the
same or a material part thereof, appoint a special receiver of such funds or
property, or of the rents, issues and profits thereof, or both, who shall give
bond with good security to be approved by the court. .. 
